MAJOR CAUSE OF IRAQ'S TENSION
THERE ARE MANY CAUSES FOR THE IRAQ'S PRESENT PROBLEMS WE CAN'T BLAME ANY SINGLE ONE ...
It’s prime minister Nuri al-Maliki who bears the greatest blame for the catastrophe unfolding in Iraq today.
Since he took office in 2006, and especially since his reelection in 2010, Maliki has become increasingly repressive and authoritarian.
Sunnis found themselves increasingly the victims of the Shia-dominated government's security forces.
Islamic leaders supports-The Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the Islamic Council of Iraq support him this create more tension in the regions.
Sunnis minority and inability to form government-In Iraq sunnis were in minority and Shias were in majority due to this majority Shias were able to form government . Iraq’s Sunnis refused to take part in Iraq’s first parliamentary elections and resorted to insurgency almost immediately after the U.S. invasion and fall of Saddam Hussein.
The Sunnis see political leadership and governance to be their birthright and resent the Shia interlopers.
Sunnis were unable to accept themselves under Shias because from the past both under the Ottomans and after independence Sunnis dominate the society thus it was not easy for them to be ruled under Shias.
Internal conflict- The ethnic divisions between Arab and Kurd, and disputes over petroleum resources,threaten to divide the country. The “Kurdish issue” is scarcely a new one in Iraq or the region.
Iraq’s Kurds sought independence during the aftermath to World War I and there have been active tensions over the creation of some form of Kurdish state ever since –tensions with links to similar Kurdish desires for autonomy or independence in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. The creation of a Kurdish security zone after the Gulf War has led to the creation of a Kurdistan Regional Government (the KRG) that has practical autonomy and whose leaders – like its president Massoud Barzani -- occasionally threaten to seek full independence.
The KRG not only controls clearly Kurdish areas but dispute control of a large amount of territory from Kirkuk to Mosul along what some call Iraq’s ethnic fracture zone. The KRG is also involved in a continuing struggle over control of Iraq petroleum resources in northern Iraq and its right to exploit the resource in its own zone. There are other power struggles over the structure and funding of Kurdish (Pesh Merga) versus Iraqi forces, and the allocation of central government funds and central government controlled oil export revenues. The KRG also now faces a future where it may receive far less foreign aid and
see the central government limit the flow of these oil revenues while it jockey with the central government over the role of Turkey in the region and has taken the side of Syrian Kurds in the Syrian civil war.
Masood Barzani,the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party who dreams of an independent Kurdistan, has also done what he can to undermine the authority of the government in Baghdad, by essentially running his own economic, oil, and foreign policies.
Iraq’s Neighbour- Iraq’s Sunni neighbors, notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but also Qatar, also not support a Shia government in Baghdad thus they support Iraq’s Sunni’s by helping them.
Iraq’s Sunni neighbors have exacerbated Shia fears and made it more difficult for them to pursue a more inclusive policy vis-à-vis the Sunnis.
Iraq’s Sunni’s get money from individual donors and tacit support from some officials in the Gulf Arab states to make Shia’s government unstable.
Conflicting U.S. policy objectives in the region have also led it to pursue policies in Iraq that have contributed to current U.S. dilemmas. The most glaring example was the U.S. courting of Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders, both of which were thus emboldened to commit acts such as attacking the Shia shrines in Samara in 2006 and frightening the Shias that the United States would again betray them as it did at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Iraq faces a growing mix of related challenges in defining its “Arab” identify; in the de facto segregation of its Arab Shi’ite and Arab Sunni population, and in defining the role of Islam in its society and state.
There is no clear split between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi’ite in today’s heavily urbanized Iraq, but mixed cities and towns are increasingly divided into Sunni and Shi’ite areas, the southeast is largely Shi’ite and has much of the nation’s currently producing petroleum wealth, and Iraq’s west is largely Sunni and more tribal.
The emergence of a Shi’ite dominated central government since 2010 has tended to alienate many Arab Sunnis and push the West back towards at least the toleration of extremist movements like Al Qa’ida while pushing Shi’ite areas on reliance on the Shi’ite dominated security forces and local Shi’ite security security forces. Iraq’s “Arab” identify is not only affected by the Kurdish issue, but by the increase division of Arab into Sunni and Shi’ite -- coupled to a growing polarization around more fundamentalist or extreme interpretations of Sunni Salafist and Shi’ite Twelver practices and beliefs – mirroring the
broader struggle between the majority of Islamic moderates and a minority of hardline or and some violent religious extremists.
Posted by Akash Pandey | Sunday, 22 June 2014 | 11:11:00 am